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a b s t r a c t
Cyber-attacks affect every aspect of our lives. These attacks have serious consequences, not only for
cyber-security, but also for safety, as the cyber and physical worlds are increasingly linked. Provid-
ing effective cyber-security requires cooperation and collaboration among all the entities involved.
Increasing the amount of cyber threat information (CTI) available for analysis allows better prediction,
prevention and mitigation of cyber-attacks. However, organizations are deterred from sharing their CTI
over concerns that sensitive and confidential information may be revealed to others. We address this
concern by providing a flexible framework that allows the confidential sharing of CTI for analysis
between collaborators. We propose a five-level trust model for a cloud-edge based data sharing
infrastructure. The data owner can choose an appropriate trust level and CTI data sanitization approach,
ranging from plain text, through anonymization/pseudonymization to homomorphic encryption, in
order to manipulate the CTI data prior to sharing it for analysis. Furthermore, this sanitization can be
performed by either an edge device or by the cloud service provider, depending upon the level of trust
the organization has in the latter. We describe our trust model, our cloud-edge infrastructure, and its
deployment model, which are designed to satisfy the broadest range of requirements for confidential
CTI data sharing. Finally we briefly describe our implementation and the testing that has been carried
out so far by four pilot projects that are validating our infrastructure.
© 2019 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
Most organizations today operate one or more security ap-
plications, such as firewalls, antivirus software or intrusion de-
tection systems. Each of these systems creates its own log data,
containing raw cyber threat information (CTI). CTI is defined quite
broadly by the National Institute of Standard and Technology
(NIST) as any valuable information that can be used to identify,
assess, monitor and respond to cyber threats [1]. Analysis of the
CTI produces valuable cyber threat intelligence that informs the
user about threats to their systems. Whilst off the shelf security
applications contain their own built-in analysis tools, and inform
the user about the majority of the threats affecting their sys-
tems, they rarely capture all the active threats due to the rapidly
evolving threat landscape, the amount of CTI that has to be
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: d.w.chadwick@kent.ac.uk (D.W. Chadwick).
processed and the sheer complexity of processing this data. Most
organizations, particularly small and medium sized enterprises
(SMEs), do not have the knowledge, time or resources to analyse
the CTI themselves, and either rely on the built-in analysis of the
security tools they purchase, or outsource to third party providers
that specialize in securing systems and identifying threats. Due
to the sensitivity of the CTI, third party providers are invariably
constrained to analysing individual organizations’ CTIs, and to
operating Chinese Walls so that conflicts of interest do not arise,
and sensitive information does not leak between its customers.
However, the inability to pool the CTI frommultiple organizations
and to analyse the combined data, means that some threats are
bound to be missed.
If the organizations are willing to collaborate and share CTI,
the sharing of CTI between collaborating organizations is neces-
sarily complex. On the one hand, an organization may be willing
to share its CTI logs with other organizations if this means that
remote attacking systems can be more easily identified, but not if
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.future.2019.06.026
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this means that its own vulnerable systems are also identified to
its collaborating organizations. It is the CTI sharing problem that
our research addresses.
The contributions of this paper are as follows:
– We define a 5-level trust model that allows organizations to
determine their level of trust in (a) the cloud infrastructure
provider and (b) their peer collaborating organizations,
– We define a data sharing and analysis framework that al-
lows organizations to confidentially share their CTI data
with collaborating organizations, dependent upon the level
of trust they have in them,
– We specify the various deployment models that are avail-
able to cloud instantiations of the framework that allow
organizations to regulate the amount of trust they have in
the cloud infrastructure provider.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 de-
scribes the related research in cloud-edge computing, CTI data
sharing and the data security issues in cloud-edge computing.
Section 3 describes our trust model, whilst Section 4 provides a
detailed description of the data sharing infrastructure and the dif-
ferent deployment models that are supported. Section 5 outlines
the four pilot projects that are being used to validate the data
sharing infrastructure. It says what levels of trust they have and
the different deployment models they have chosen to satisfy their
trust requirements. Section 6 provides a brief description of the
implementation to date, the acceptance testing methodology that
we have adopted and the validation work that we have already
performed. Section 7 concludes with the limitations of the work
to date and where future work is still required.
2. Related work
This section provides a brief overview of cloud-edge com-
puting followed by a literature review of security research in
cloud-edge computing.
2.1. Cloud-edge oriented computing
Edge computing aims to deliver compute, storage, and band-
width much closer to the data sources and/or end users. Though
research on edge-oriented computing is still in its infancy and we
lack a universally accepted open standard [2], there are a number
of definitions of edge computing available, e.g., Shi et al. [3] say
that edge computing refers to the enabling technologies allowing
computation to be performed at the edge of the network. Zhang
et al. [4] say edge computing is a novel computing model that
allows the storing and processing of data at the edge of the
network, and provides intelligent services near to the source of
the data by collaborating with cloud computing. A similar concept
to edge computing is fog computing, which was first proposed
by Cisco, and aimed at extending cloud computing to the edge
of network [5]. Vaquero and Rodero-Merino [6] defined ‘‘fog
computing is a scenario where a huge number of heterogeneous
(wireless and sometimes autonomous) ubiquitous and decen-
tralized devices communicate and potentially cooperate among
them and with the network to perform storage and processing
tasks without the intervention of third parties. These tasks can
be for supporting basic network functions or new services and
applications that run in a sandboxed environment. Users leasing
part of their devices to host these services get incentives for doing
so’’.
There is no clear distinguishing feature between fog comput-
ing and edge computing, since both push the intelligence and
processing capabilities out of a centralized infrastructure into the
logical extremes of the network close to the data sources and
end users. But from the resource management point of view, the
Fog, compared with the Edge, is a highly virtualized platform that
provides computation, storage, and networking services between
end devices and cloud computing data centres [5]. In most iden-
tifiable scenarios, fog computing is often used when the task is
service oriented, while edge computing occurs more if it is as
an analytical task. From a hierarchical design view, the Fog is
located between the Cloud and the Edge [7], such that a cloud-
fog-edge three-tiered architecture has been recognized in many
prior works [8–10].
In general, edge-oriented computing can bring three promi-
nent benefits to end users. First, reduce latency: the latency to
the end user can be lower than it would be if the compute
was farther away. Second, mitigate bandwidth limits: the ability
to move workloads closer to the end users or data collection
points reduces the effect of limited bandwidth at a site. This
is especially useful if the service on the edge node reduces the
need to transmit large amounts of data to the core for processing.
Third, increase security: data can be pre-processed and protected
before it is transferred to the cloud. It is the last benefit that we
leverage in our project.
2.2. Cloud-edge security
Even though cloud-edge computing can bring a number of
benefits compared with pure cloud computing, nevertheless, as
edge devices proliferate, new attack vectors are emerging that
take advantage of the proliferation of endpoints. Zhang et al. [4]
surveyed the recent research of data security in the field of edge
computing, which pointed out that the security of outsourcing
data is still a fundamental issue in edge computing data security.
Their review work comprehensively covers the research focusing
on data security, i.e. confidentiality, integrity, availability, au-
thentication, authorization, and privacy preservation. Controlling
access to data is well researched, and a standard has been defined
for this: XACML [11]. Our research makes use of this standard
by employing an enhanced XACML policy decision point (PDP) to
enforce our Data Sharing Agreement (DSA) policies. Our proposal
for sharing CTI data covers all the issues mentioned by Zhang
and is based on research by Carniani et al. [12] that proposed the
design and implementation of a Usage Control Service to regulate
the usage of resources in a Cloud IaaS service. They enhanced an
XACML PDP to achieve this and integrated their solution into the
OpenNebula Cloud platform.
Henze et al. [13] proposed a trust point, which is a local
security-enhanced gateway at the border of a sensor network,
that processes the sensor data before outsourcing it. In this trust
point-based security architecture, the authors specified three
trust domains: the fully trusted producer domain, containing the
sensor nodes, the gateway devices and the data owner; the semi-
trusted storage domain, including the cloud and cloud providers,
who are assumed to be an honest-but-curious adversary; the
untrusted consumer domain, consisting of entities such as ser-
vices and service providers. Furthermore, the authors presented
security solutions to address: the communication channel be-
tween the sensor network and the cloud, data confidentiality
and privacy preservation for outsourcing the sensor data, and
controlling access to the outsourced sensor data. However, their
work had a static trust model and did not take into account
different data protection mechanisms for different trust domains.
In comparison, we assume a dynamic trust model, with user
specified data protection mechanisms.
The existing approaches for provably secure outsourcing of
data and arbitrary computations are either not scalable (e.g.
tamper-proof hardware based) or not efficient (e.g. fully homo-
morphic encryption). Consequently, the Twin Clouds architec-
ture [14] was proposed, consisting of a trusted private Cloud
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and an untrusted public Cloud. They apply the concept of gar-
bled circuits to protect data and computation instructions in the
public Cloud. The trusted private Cloud is used to encrypt data
and computation instructions. Then the protected computation
instructions can be securely processed in the public Cloud. The
drawbacks of this approach are that the computation instruc-
tions can only carry out simple operations and they have to be
re-encrypted by the private Cloud after each execution.
Pearson et al. [15] proposed a data management solution for
protecting data in the Cloud that focuses on fine-grained access
control of the outsourced data by attaching a sticky policy to
the data, which states how and under which circumstances the
data can be accessed. This is similar to our work. However, their
trusted policy enforcement point requires the establishment of
a trust metric for all external entities, rather than this being
controlled by the user, as in our work.
Martinelli et al. [16] proposed a general model for a privacy
aware collaborative information sharing and analysis system. This
approach can calculate a trade-off score on privacy gain and
data utility loss over the privacy preserving mechanism. The
trade-off score leads to optimizing the analysis result with re-
gard to the balance between privacy and accuracy. However, this
paper only considered either a fully centralized (i.e. cloud) or
fully distributed/P2P (i.e. edge) architecture, rather than the more
practical hybrid (cloud-edge) architecture, with different trust
domains, which is a feature of our work.
Several authors propose to process the data locally [17–19]
and only utilize the cloud for storage of sanitized data. They
cannot benefit from the computation resources provided by the
cloud but they can guarantee that neither the cloud provider nor
any other unauthorized third-parties can access their sensitive
information. In comparison, our data security model is tailored
towards not only storage but also processing in the cloud.
2.3. CTI data sharing
Sharing of CTI within a consortium or collection of similar
organizations can be extremely beneficial because the member
organizations often face common threats that are targeted to-
wards similar type of systems, services and data. Cyber-security
will be more effective if these organizations could work together
to detect or prevent cyber threats facing them. Such collaboration
helps in reducing risks faced by both the individual organization
as well as the whole collective. Some basic methods of sharing
CTI include public publishing of security alerts (like US-CERT
alerts) [20], NVD vulnerability advisories [21], and security ven-
dors’ security bulletins. A more extensive list of potential CTI is
given in the CWE [22], CVE [23] and CVSS [24] listings. Although
all of these solutions and services share valuable information with
the consumers, it is a one-way approach and most organizations
do not or cannot easily reciprocate by sharing their CTI with these
services.
Some cyber-security solutions do exist that are more closely
related to our work, both in the proprietary and public domains.
Proprietary solutions, like BT Security Threat Monitoring [25],
monitor and collect security events from their customers. How-
ever almost without exception, the collated data is not shared
with anyone. In the public domain, there were EU projects like
Coco-Cloud [26] that enabled cloud users to securely and pri-
vately share their information. Similarly, CIF [27] is a CTI manage-
ment system that supports aggregation, processing and sharing of
CTI, but does not have any capabilities for addressing the sensitive
nature of some CTI data by using anonymization or encryption
techniques.
Zhou et al. [28] surveyed collaborative intrusion detection
systems (CIDS) that address coordinated attacks. Such attacks
(e.g. large-scale scans, worm outbreaks and DDoS attacks) often
occur simultaneously in multiple networks. Consequently, shar-
ing alert data in CIDS can bring a global view and collaborative
analysis results to the users. The main research challenges are
alert correlation algorithms and appropriate CIDS architectures,
which were categorized as centralized CIDS, hybrid CIDS and fully
distributed CIDS, which are similar to our deployment models
described later. Both Lo et al. [29] and Shu et al. [30] proposed
using CIDS to detect DDoS attacks to Cloud Computing, whereby
one regional IDS shares its alert data with the other IDS sys-
tems. This can help to reduce the overall computational costs of
detecting the same attacks in multiple IDS systems and there-
fore improves overall detection rates. The difference between
them is that Lo uses the fully distributed architecture while Shu
uses the hybrid architecture. Furthermore, Shu proposed using
a Back-Propagation Neural (BPN) network to detect unknown
attacks.
The utility and analysis accuracy of shared CTI data are ob-
viously based on the utility of the CTI data obtained from the
different sources. Clear text data has most utility, but sharing this
often results in privacy leaks, since the CTI may include sensitive
information that should not be shared with the other untrusted
or unauthenticated partners. There has been plenty of research
investigating privacy-preserving data sharing [9]. Fung et al. [8]
proposed the privacy-preserving data publishing approach in or-
der to optimize the trade-off between data utility and privacy.
Different security requirements and metrics often lead to the use
of distinct privacy-preserving data mining techniques [10]. Thus,
it is necessary to have a flexible privacy-preserving data sharing
model that can address the trade-off between data privacy and
data utility, whilst taking into account the different levels of trust
that collaborators have in each other. This is a subject of our
research.
The EU H2020 project, Proactive Risk Management through
Improved Cyber Situational Awareness (PROTECTIVE) [31] is in-
vestigating how to improve cyber security incident and risk man-
agement for public domain CSIRTs and SMEs. Coco-Cloud was an
earlier EU project that enabled cloud users to share data securely
and privately. It first proposed the use of Data Sharing Agreement
(DSA) between collaborating users [26], but was not tailored to
CTI. We make use of the DSA developed by the Coco Cloud project,
and have enhanced it for use with CTI.
2.4. Use of distributed ledger technology
Distributed Ledgers Technology (DLT) [32] is proposed as the
evolution of data control from a single entity to multiple parties.
Rather than having the central administrator of a traditional
database, a distributed ledger is a synchronized database across
several locations and among multiple participants. This provides
an auditable history of data transactions which is visible to every
participant. One might consider blockchain to be a possible solu-
tion for the distributed deployment of C3ISP, e.g. Liang et al. [33]
proposed a mobile healthcare system Integrating blockchain for
personal health data sharing and collaboration. Although this
addressed the sharing of data using blockchain, it did not consider
the analysis of the data or the sharing of the results. Since DLT is
more about the shared control of data rather than the confidential
sharing of data, which is the subject of our research, one might
consider DLTs to make the confidential sharing of data more
difficult since there are now more nodes in control of copies. To
address this, Es-Samaali et al. [34] presented a new distributed
access control framework for big data based on blockchain tech-
nology. The authors applied Smart contracts [35] to express fine-
grained and contextual access control policies for authorization
decisions. Likewise, Wang et al. [36] proposed a blockchain-
based framework for data sharing, which uses attribute-based
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encryption (ABE) technology for facilitating data privacy and fine-
grained access control. In summary, there is no blockchain solu-
tion that would allow a straightforward deployment of the C3ISP
Framework, although some solutions for specific functions do
exist.
3. The trust model
Our trust model recognizes three basic levels of trust in the
various parties: fully trusted, partially trusted and untrusted. Par-
tially trusted means a party who is honest but curious i.e. it will
not deviate from the protocol, but it may attempt to learn infor-
mation from legitimately received messages e.g. an administrator
may read the contents of files that has been stored on his ma-
chine, but would not modify them nor transfer them elsewhere.
These three levels of trust can be applied to the following parties:
the cloud infrastructure provider that runs the data sharing and
analysis infrastructure,1 and the collaborating organizations with
whom the CTI data is to be shared for subsequent analysis. Data
owners have to decide what trust they place in each of these
parties and then act accordingly.
This leads to a five-level trust model as follows:
– Level 1, fully trusted: the organization sharing its CTI fully
trusts all the other parties (both the collaborating organi-
zations and the cloud infrastructure provider), and is will-
ing to share its CTI with them ‘‘as is’’ for analysis i.e. as
un-sanitized plain text;
– Level 2, fully trusted cloud infrastructure provider, par-
tially trusted collaborators: the organization fully trusts the
provider and is therefore willing to share its CTI ‘‘as is’’
with the cloud, providing that the CTI can be sanitized by
the provider by either anonymization or pseudonymization
before it is stored and shared with the other collaborators
for analysis;
– Level 3, fully trusted cloud infrastructure provider,
untrusted collaborators: the organization sharing its CTI
fully trusts the provider and is therefore willing to share
its CTI ‘‘as is’’ with the cloud, providing that the CTI can
be protected by the provider encrypting the CTI before it
is stored and shared with the other untrusted collaborators.
Since the shared CTI needs to be analysed, this means that
homomorphic encryption must be employed
– Level 4, partially trusted: the organization sharing its CTI
partially trusts all the other parties, and is willing to share
its CTI providing that the sensitive fields can either be
anonymized or pseudonymized prior to sharing;
– Level 5, not trusted: the organization sharing its CTI does
not trust the other collaborating organizations or the cloud
infrastructure provider performing the analysis, and is only
willing to share its CTI if it is fully encrypted prior to sharing.
Since the shared CTI needs to be analysed, this means that
homomorphic encryption must be employed.
Note that fully or partially trusted collaborators with a less
trusted cloud infrastructure provider are not viable trust levels
as the CTI would necessarily need to be sanitized to the trust
level of the cloud infrastructure provider before it is transferred
to it for sharing and analysis with the collaborators. Furthermore,
a partially trusted cloud infrastructure provider and untrusted
collaborating organizations (aka level 4.5) is also not a viable
option from a performance perspective as this would require data
1 In all cases, we assume that the software implementation of the infrastruc-
ture is fully trusted. By this, we mean that the software implementation does
not have any backdoors or trojans embedded in it., and that all known bugs are
fixed immediately.
sanitization to be undertaken by both the owning organization
and then the cloud infrastructure provider. Although we have not
separately enumerated it, it is theoretically possible.
In order to support our trust model, the protection of the
CTI prior to sharing is conceptually performed by one or more
Data Manipulation Operations (DMOs) on the CTI. A DMO can
either remove, anonymize, pseudonymize or homomorphically
encrypt a CTI field prior to sharing it. For level 1 trust, a null
DMO is needed i.e. the original CTI data can be shared. For level 2
trust, the DMO operation will pseudonymize or anonymize a CTI
field prior to sharing it. This is carried out by the trusted cloud
provider. The ultimate in anonymization is to remove the field
altogether. For level 3 trust the DMO operation homomorphically
encrypts the CTI field. Again, this is carried out by the trusted
cloud infrastructure provider. For level 4 trust, the DMO oper-
ations of level 2 are carried out by the sharing organization in
its edge device. For level 5 trust the level 3 DMO operations are
carried out by the sharing organization in its edge device. (For
level 4.5 the DMO operations of level 4 would be carried out,
followed by the DMO operations of level 3).
There is always a trade-off between data anonymization and
data utility. As a generalization, the more anonymous the data
is made, the less useful it becomes. The most extreme example
of data anonymization is to remove certain fields from the data
as stated above, but less extreme examples of anonymization can
also significantly impact the utility. For example, by anonymizing
IP addresses before the analysis, if the analysis subsequently
reveals that a certain (anonymized) IP address is attacking the
organization, this information is much less useful since it is
impossible to learn what this IP address is and therefore configure
a firewall to block it. Pseudonymisation suffers far less in this
respect, since it is always possible to retrieve the original data
again after pseudonymisation.
The DMOs are specified in a Data Sharing Agreement (DSA),
which is the mechanism used by a sharing organization to specify
what its trust policy is for sharing data with the cloud infras-
tructure provider and its collaborating partners. An edge device
of the sharing organization will bind its DSA to the CTI before
it is transferred to the cloud-edge infrastructure for sharing. The
DMOs will be executed either in an edge device, or in the cloud
by the cloud provider as described above, depending upon the
level of trust the organization has. The DSA policy (enforced by
the DMO) regulates the means to sanitize the data according to
the user’s requirements. Such requirements will ensure that the
data does not lose its utility after the application of the DMOs
(otherwise there would be little point in sharing it for analysis).
4. The C3ISP architecture
This section describes the C3ISP2 architecture and its subsys-
tems, as well as their interactions. It then describes the vari-
ous deployment models for the infrastructure, for distributing it
between the cloud and edge devices.
The C3ISP Framework is the main component designed to run
in the cloud. The Local ISI is a component of the C3ISP Framework,
and is designed to run in an edge device for trust levels 4 and
5 (i.e. where the cloud provider is not fully trusted). The C3ISP
Gateway and Portal are designed to run in either the user’s edge
devices or in the cloud services, depending on the different use
cases as presented in the later sections on the pilot studies. Fig. 1
makes no assumptions about where the CTI data comes from. For
example, the user’s organization could be using an outsourced
2 The name is derived from the name of the EU H2020 project in which it
was developed: Collaborative and Confidential Information Sharing and Analysis
for Cyber Protection (C3ISP) [37].
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Fig. 1. An overview of C3ISP architecture.
Managed Security Service provider to operate its firewalls, AVS,
IDS etc. in its devices, and this third party would collect the CTI
that is subsequently going to be analysed by the C3ISP Frame-
work. Alternatively, the user’s organization could be operating
its own protection software and producing the CTI itself. Either
way, the CTI is provided to the C3ISP Gateway via a pluggable
component (the MSS client in Fig. 4). Users may access the C3ISP
infrastructure through a web browser, whose access to all the
C3ISP components is mediated by the C3ISP Portal and Gateway.
4.1. The C3ISP cloud framework
The C3ISP Framework comprises 4 main subsystems: the Data
Sharing
Agreement (DSA) Manager, the Information Sharing Infrastruc-
ture (ISI), the Information Analytics Infrastructure (IAI), and the
Common Security Services (CSS) as shown in Fig. 2.
A Prosumer is an actor who may play the role of Producer
and/or Consumer. A Producer is an actor who supplies its own
CTI data to the C3ISP infrastructure for sharing with other actors
prior to analysis. A Consumer is an actor who performs analysis
on the shared CTI data and consumes the results. CTI data sharing
is regulated by policies (i.e. a set of rules) called a Data Sharing
Agreement (DSA).
The Data Sharing Agreement (DSA) Manager is in charge
of handling the DSA lifecycle, from template creation, policy in-
stantiation, DSA usage and termination. A security expert defines
a set of policy templates, each with a specific purpose for a
particular trust model e.g. anonymize particular CTI fields, omit
certain CTI fields, or homomorphically encrypt the CTI. A large
set of policy templates have already been defined by the security
experts in the C3ISP consortium, and these will be released along
with the open source code. A set of prosumers collaboratively
instantiate a policy from one of the templates, in order to tailor
it to their specific requirements e.g. say who the collaborating
prosumers are, who can access the analysis results etc. Templates
and instantiated policies are held in the DSA store for subsequent
retrieval by authorized users. DSAs have a lifetime, so that when
a DSA expires, prosumers may no longer access any CTI that is
protected by this policy. This ensures that CTI is not inadvertently
left stored for long periods of time, giving unauthorized users
more chance of accessing it. Templates and policies are initially
written in a human readable controlled natural language (CNL)
via the Policy Editor (see Figs. 3 and 6), and the DSA Mapper
converts this into an enhanced XACML policy for enforcement at
run time.
A DSA comprises the following components:
Fig. 2. An overview of C3ISP cloud Framework.
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Fig. 3. Example DMOs in CNL for anonymization by suppression.
– a set of Data Manipulation Operations (DMOs), which say
how the attached CTI should be protected prior to storage;
– a usage control access control policy, that defines who is
allowed to access the attached CTI for what purposes, and
under what constraints;
– a set of obligations that are placed on the use of the attached
CTI data, and in particular, rules for how the DSA should be
inherited by any analysis results that are derived from the
attached CTI.
The Information Sharing Infrastructure (ISI) supports the
management of Data Protected Objects (DPOs). A DPO is CTI data
with a sticky DSA policy attached to it. This bundle is first en-
crypted by the DSA Adapter, which includes a specific component,
the Bundle Manager, for managing DPOs, before it is stored in the
DPO store. The Bundle Manager employs the Encryption Manager
of the CSS subsystem for performing encryption/decryption op-
erations. This ensures that if the DPO store is compromised, the
attacker will not retrieve any useful information from it. DPOs
can be created, retrieved (for analysis), deleted, and moved (from
edge to cloud) by the ISI API.
CTI comes in many different formats — nearly every security
application has its own unique format. We have chosen to use the
standard STIX format defined by NIST [38] as the common DPO
storage format. Consequently, the Format Adapter, which is part
of the ISI Subsysetm, converts the CTI from its local format into
the STIX format before it is inserted in the DPO.
The DSA Adapter also enforces the prosumer’s DSA on the
CTI before it is stored in the DPO store, and every time it is
retrieved from the DPO store for performing an analytics service.
As stated, the DSA contains a set of authorization rules with a set
of Data Manipulation Operations (DMOs). The authorization rules
are evaluated by the Authorization Engine embedded in the DSA
Adapter in order to determine whether the CTI can be exploited
to perform the requested operation. If the authorization rules
allow the usage of the CTI, the related DMO must be executed
before the CTI can be actually used. Each DMO specifies one
operation to be performed on the CTI e.g. anonymize the source
IP address via substring removal, or remove the number of bytes
transferred. Another form of anonymization adopts Differential
Privacy techniques [39]: intuitively, they allow us to preserve
specific properties of a dataset while altering each of the dataset’s
values. As an example, Geo-indistinguishability [40] allows us to
scramble each geographic location in a dataset (thus making re-
identification a very difficult exercise) but preserving an arbitrary
consistency with the original distribution DMOs provide users
with full control over the confidentiality of their CTI, and allow
them to remove, pseudonymize, anonymize or homomorphically
encrypt the fields of their CTI before it is shared with other pro-
sumers. DMOs are associated with authorization rules by means
of obligations similar to those stated in the UCONABC model [41].
Such obligations allow additional actions to be performed, for
example, a forced deletion of CTI data when the DSA-prescribed
retention period expires. Such mechanisms reinforce the control
that prosumers have on their CTIs.
The Information Analytics Infrastructure (IAI) provides the
interface for invoking analytics services on the DPOs that have
been shared and (centrally) stored through the ISI. A consumer
selects the set of DPOs to be combined for analysis, and says
which analytics service should be invoked. The analytics execu-
tion result is computed under the control of the DPOs’ common
DSA, which provides the usage control policy for the Service
Usage Control Adaptor (an enhanced XACML PDP).
The DSA also contains inheritance rules for the handling of
the analytics result. The analytics result, coupled with the DSA
inherited from the common DSA, is submitted as a new DPO to
the ISI, from where it can be retrieved by authorized consumers,
and also used as an input to subsequent analytics services.
Finally, the Common Security Services (CSS) support several
of the functions of the C3ISP architecture. The Identity Man-
ager authenticates the prosumers, and provides their identity
attributes to the enhanced XACML PDP. The Secure Audit Man-
ager is necessary to trace the operations performed within the
C3ISP infrastructure, in particular those related to access and
usage decisions, and to guarantee system accountability to show
it operates as planned and as specified in the DSA rules. The Key
and Encryption Manager provides for the confidentiality of the
computations by homomorphically encrypting the CTI data, and
the secrecy of the stored CTI data by encrypting the DPOs.
4.2. The C3ISP cloud-edge framework
Edge computers normally run the C3ISP Gateway and the Por-
tal of the C3ISP Architecture. All the dashed components in Fig. 4
are optional edge components, and depend upon the resources
and trust level used by the prosumer’s organization.
The C3ISP Gateway is the interface/middleware between the
end user’s environment and the C3ISP Framework. The C3ISP
Gateway retrieves/collects CTI data from different data sources.
The Managed Security Service (MSS) Client in Fig. 4 is a compo-
nent that has to be tailored to the end user’s environment. It is
responsible for collecting the CTI and uploading it to the C3ISP
infrastructure (in the cloud or the edge) for sharing and analysis.
Through an easy to use web interface (the Portal) to the C3ISP
Gateway, the user is able to manage all of their C3ISP related
tasks with only a standard web browser, i.e. choosing which CTI
data to share and on what schedule, creating and selecting DSAs,
running collaborative analytics etc. The Orchestrator will accept
user scheduled tasks and periodically collect CTI and run analytics
tasks automatically on behalf of the user.
The local ISI has identical functionality to the cloud-based ISI,
but has a different placement and deployment configuration (see
below). It is needed for trust levels 4 and 5 where the operator
of the cloud-based ISI is not fully trusted to sanitize the sensitive
CTI of the prosumer. In particular, the local ISI supports the Move
operation, to move protected DPOs from the edge to the cloud ISI.
The local ISI configures a local DPO store for storing the protected
CTI data in the edge prior to invoking the Move operation. The
DSA Adaptor in the local ISI is used to sanitize the CTI data before
sharing it with the central C3ISP Framework, through evaluating
the DMOs contained within the DSA. In this way any sensitive
CTI fields are protected before moving them to the (partially)
untrusted cloud provider.
4.3. Deployment models
We foresee different ways to instantiate the C3ISP Framework
and we refer to them as deployment models. A deployment model
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Fig. 4. The C3ISP Gateway Architecture.
is a specific C3ISP configuration in which the C3ISP Framework
subsystems are deployed to match specific use case scenarios and
trust requirements. Prosumer organizations choose the deploy-
ment model according to their specific business requirements, in
particular taking into account the level of trust they have or need
for the use cases to be supported.
The deployment models describe where the main C3ISP
Framework subsystems can be deployed, either in edge devices
in the prosumer’s environment, or in a cloud environment, or in
a combination of the two. We have identified four deployment
models for supporting a broad range of possible scenarios. In most
cases, the Gateway and Portal run on edge devices.
• Fully centralized: all C3ISP Framework subsystems operate
in the cloud only. This model supports the three fully trusted
levels of trust.
• Hybrid: the ISI operates on both an edge device and the
cloud, with all the other framework subsystems being cloud
based. This model is designed primarily to supports trust
levels 4 and 5 by performing all the data manipulation
operations in the Local ISI, although it can support trust 1, 2
and 3 by not performing any data manipulation operations
in the Local ISI.
• Distributed ISI: the ISI is on an edge device only and the IAI
and DSA Manager are in the cloud. This model supports the
partially trusted and untrusted levels of trust.
• Fully distributed: all C3ISP Framework subsystems operate
on edge devices. This model supports the untrusted level
only. The storage, sharing and analysis is done in a com-
pletely distributed manner, exploiting a distributed hash
table (DHT) based model for communication, distribution of
information and computation. Some analytics such as those
based on Secure Multi-Party Computation are particularly
suitable for this deployment model.
Fig. 5 shows the trust versus data control trade-offs in the de-
ployment models:
A special consideration has to be made for the CSS subsys-
tem: this subsystem has a critical role in the trustworthiness of
the C3ISP Framework, in particular when considering distributed
scenarios. For example, a distributed CSS for identity manage-
ment could leverage identity federation technologies. Key and
encryption services could leverage a PKI to address key distribu-
tion issues. Auditing, however, should preferably be centralized,
maybe at a trusted third party, to address segregation of du-
ties and non-repudiation. The simplest scenario is a centralized
cloud deployment for the CSS with the assumption that it is
Table 1
Relative effects of data manipulation on privacy, accuracy and performance.
Data manipulation operation Privacy Accuracy Performance
None — Plain text Low High High
Pseudonymization Medium High Medium
Anonymization High Low Medium
Homomorphic encryption High High Very low
fully trusted by all the Prosumers. However, the architecture
can cope with existing consolidated solutions in the domain of
identity management, key and encryption manager, and auditing,
provided that they use standard interfaces and are aligned with
the expectations expressed here.
Whilst there are several valid data processing approaches for
privacy-preserving the outsourcing of CTI data analysis, neverthe-
less there are some other concerns that also need to be taken
into account, because the distinct privacy-preserving outsourcing
approaches have different impacts on data analysis accuracy and
data processing performance. Table 1 shows the relative effects
of various data manipulation approaches on the privacy, accuracy
and performance of the data analytics service.
We can see that analysing plain text has the highest accuracy
and performance but no privacy preserving. Pseudonymization
(e.g. encryption based), homomorphic encryption techniques and
anonymization all provide privacy but at some cost to perfor-
mance, with homomorphic encryption being the worst. In ad-
dition, anonymization techniques suffer from loss of accuracy.
Hence, only in the extreme case of no trust in the analytics service
or in the other data sharing prosumers should homomorphic
encryption be used.
5. The C3ISP pilots
Four pilot projects are validating the C3ISP infrastructure, to
see how well it fits their various security and trust requirements
for confidentially sharing CTI data for analysis. These are the En-
terprise Pilot, the SME Pilot, the ISP Pilot and the CERT Pilot. The
pilots represent a wide set of use cases, to see if the infrastructure
is widely applicable.
5.1. The enterprise pilot
The Enterprise pilot is concerned with providing a Security and
Threat Intelligence Monitoring service to relatively large public
and private sector organizations. These organizations typically
outsource to Managed Security Service Providers (MSSPs) [42].
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Fig. 5. Trust vs. data control trade-off in the deployment models.
MSSPs quite often offer a platform solution as the MSS for cyber
threat monitoring and analytics for these organizations. Exam-
ples of such platform solutions include BT Cyber Security Plat-
form [43], BT Security Threat Monitoring [25], SAP Enterprise
Threat Detection [44], McAfee Enterprise Security Manager [45]
and Alien Vault Unified Security [46]. The MSS platform is a
centralized solution at the MSSP side. Such a platform typically
but not necessarily consists of a Data Lake, existing portals and
tools. The collected CTI data is processed, analysed and in case
threats are detected, reactions are triggered in collaboration with
the customer. At present, the CTI data of each customer are
stored in distinguished data lakes and analysed in isolation. In
principle, the greater the volume and variety of data available
for analysis and correlation, the better or higher the quality of
threat information that can be provided. Thus combining the
analysis of data from multiple customers has advantages both
to the MSSP and its customers. However, concerns about ex-
posing sensitive information to competitors and threat agents
may make security conscious enterprises reluctant to allow this
without safeguards and assurances. At a higher level, there are
also benefits to be obtained by sharing threat intelligence among
service providers and CERTs, but the initial focus of this pilot is on
the intra-service-provider application of the C3ISP infrastructure.
Since all the CTI data, which has previously been collected
from the enterprises premises, is stored centrally at the MSSP’s
premises (i.e. on a multi-tenanted data lake), and the MSSP will be
the operator of the C3ISP cloud infrastructure, then the fully cen-
tralized deployment model is chosen. Each enterprise customer
(or MSSP analyst working on behalf of the customer) is able to
define its own DSA policies, depending upon its level of trust in
the other customers with whom it will share its CTI data.
In this Pilot, the Gateway is run by the MSSP rather than the
enterprise. The enterprise accesses the Gateway to request the
MSSP to share its CTI with the C3ISP infrastructure. The MSSP
processes the relevant security events and logs for that enterprise
in order to generate the CTI. The enterprise selects its DSA, again
via the Gateway, and thereafter, the MSSP will be in charge of
sending the CTI and DSA to the C3ISP Framework, which will
analyse the CTI in terms of the DSA and send the C3ISP analysis
results back to the enterprise. Note that in this Pilot, the MSSP
also has its own data analysis capability. However, this capability
is of limited scope as it only focuses on the data from a single
enterprise domain. The C3ISP Framework, on the other hand, is
able to collect and aggregate CTI from multiple enterprises, so
that it can have a broader scope to carry out the security analysis.
5.2. The SME pilot
The SME Pilot is concerned with the collection and shar-
ing of SME cyber security data with the C3ISP service without
disclosing privacy sensitive information. SMEs typically have lim-
ited resources and expertise. Consequently, SME participation
in the C3ISP eco-system needs to be done seamlessly with as
little effort as possible, which means that most of the required
management and operational processes should be offloaded in
order to minimize the utilization of SME resources (i.e. software
and hardware). The SMEs need to be able to choose the type
of confidentiality controls that are appropriate for safeguarding
their CTI data by the C3ISP Service, e.g., to go for either open
access, or data anonymization/pseudonymization techniques, or
even use homomorphic encryption based techniques. Specific
SME requirements are:
• Due to the availability of different data confidentiality and
access options, the SMEs need to be able to confidently share
their specific types of CTI data via the C3ISP Framework,
with fully trusted or even non-trusted collaborators.
• The C3ISP Framework should incorporate diverse techniques
for supporting the protection of CTI data, and the SMEs
do not have to be aware of the inner workings of these
techniques. Thus, the SMEs should be able to choose from
the alternative techniques most suitable to them from their
own perspective without worrying about their design and
implementation.
• The C3ISP Framework should incorporate diverse techniques
for analysing the shared CTI without the SMEs worrying
about issues like information leakage, as this process should
be transparent to the SMEs.
The above are achieved by employing the hybrid deployment
model, and delegating the tasks for collecting, processing and
sharing the CTI to the C3ISP Gateway and local ISI. Each SME may
define its own DSA policies, and delegate the task of ‘own CTI
data’ analysis to the C3ISP cloud infrastructure. Alternatively, the
SME may collaborate with other SMEs, and define a common DSA
policy so that analysis of shared CTI data can be performed by the
C3ISP cloud infrastructure. DSA policy enforcement is performed
by the C3ISP infrastructure, and this software is always assumed
to be fully trusted. The C3ISP infrastructure provider however
need not be fully trusted, nor need the other SME collaborators.
In the current SME Pilot, all the SMEs have subscribed to
the same Managed Security Service (MSS), which collects all the
security events and logs from the assets that the SMEs have
configured to be protected by the MSS (which are usually virtual
machines). This CTI is collected by the C3ISP Gateway, which
uses the local ISI component to process and format them into
the standardized STIX format, and to then perform protection
operations (DMOs) on the formatted CTI according to the rules
in the DSA. Finally, the protected DPO is moved from the local
DPO store to the C3ISP Framework DPO store, from where it can
be subsequently analysed, either on its own, or in combination
with other DPOs that share the same DSA policy. Each analysis
generates a security report containing the analysis results, which
are stored back in the Framework DPO store. Subsequently, the
security report may be transferred, via the C3ISP Gateway, back
to the SMEs for review. Note that the MSS used in the SME Pilot is
different from the MSSP used in the Enterprise Pilot. The former
is the common and singular source of security services and CTI
for all the SMEs, whereas the latter works at a higher level of
abstraction and is the provider of possibly unique MSS to each
enterprise that is collaborating in the C3ISP eco-system.
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5.3. The ISP pilot
The ISP Pilot is concerned with the sharing of CTI that comes
from the Italian ISPs and Registro.it (the entity responsible for
managing Italy’s top-level domain names), in order to discover
and mitigate possible attacks. The C3ISP Framework provides
analytics to ISPs, which can benefit from a federation of data
analysis that is performed in a secure and private way. Thus,
ISPs will benefit from data-manipulation operations such as data-
anonymization, controlled by Data Sharing Agreements (DSAs) to
protect, regulate and guarantee an expected privacy level of CTI
shared with the C3ISP Framework. The CTI is created as a set
of security reports that are produced by Security Scan Software,
which Registro.it provides to the ISPs as a remote tool.
An ISP can be seen as an isolated entity with enough resources
to deploy some of the C3ISP components locally. Therefore, the
hybrid deployment model is chosen for the ISP Pilot, where each
ISP hosts a local ISI and remotely communicates with the cen-
tralized ISI and IAI subsystems hosted by the C3ISP infrastructure
provider.
The Gateways, running in edge devices at each ISP, collect
the CTI from dedicated servers, e.g. DNS, SSH, Netflow and the
Security Scan Software and pass it to their local ISI for formatting
into the STIX format and applying DMOs, prior to moving it
to the C3ISP infrastructure for storage, merging and subsequent
analysis. Finally, the results of the analytics are provided back to
the ISPs via their Gateways, so that they can react depending of
the kind of results received.
5.4. The CERT pilot
The CERT Pilot is concerned with fostering cyber threat in-
formation sharing between the Italian CERT and other C3ISP
stakeholders, in particular ISPs and Enterprises, with the aim
of preventing or timely reacting to security attacks. The CERT
pilot is the most general of all the pilots, and imposes notice-
able challenges, since, differently from other pilots, it has to be
ready to receive and handle any possible type of CTI information,
managing data with different formats and semantics. Moreover,
this pilot supports a plurality of possible prosumers, hence the
interface must be general enough to match the requests of both
private users, public and private organizations of different sizes.
Consequently, the CERT Pilot has adopted the hybrid deploy-
ment model in which it is the central C3ISP cloud infrastructure
provider and its prosumers, e.g. ISPs or large enterprises, are edge
organizations that run the local ISI and Gateway on their premises
in edge devices in order to sanitize and cleanse their CTI data
prior to sharing it with the CERT.
The CERT is a public entity which collects CTI from multiple
prosumers, stores and categorize the collected information and
uses it to run analysis. In particular, an analysis can be requested
by a specific prosumer, or by the CERT itself. All analysis results
are stored as DPOs, and are dispatched to interested prosumers
providing the DSA policy allows it. Finally, cyber intelligence, col-
lected or inferred from the analysis results, will be made publicly
available through the CERT website as a newsfeed related to cyber
threats of public interest.
In the next phase of development, the CTI collected from all
the different Pilots should also be sharable with the CERT C3ISP
infrastructure, in order for the CERT to be able to create a com-
mon knowledge base to prevent or react against security threats
targeting all the Pilots’ participants. Hence, the C3ISP platforms
hosted by the CERT, the Enterprise pilot (and ultimately any other
organizations) should also be able to share their CTI and or DPOs
with each other for subsequent analysis.
Table 2
Deployment models of the Pilots.
Hybrid Fully centralized C3ISP infrastructure provider
ISP Pilot  Cloud provider
CERT Pilot  CERT
Enterprise Pilot  MSSP
SME Pilot  Cloud provider
5.5. Summary of deployment models used by each C3ISP pilot
Table 2 summarizes the deployment models chosen by each
of the four Pilots.
It can be seen that none of the Pilots have chosen either of the
distributed deployment models. This is because:
(a) The Distributed ISI model is subsumed by the Hybrid model
and
(b) The Fully Distributed model is only applicable for organi-
zations that have zero trust in the other stakeholders.
The four Pilots require the collection of CTI data from different
internal and external sources. Table 3 summarizes how this is
handled by each Pilot. Note that CTI collection from the wide
range of prosumers in the CERT pilot is not yet complete.
All the Pilots need to have some form of data sanitization
available to them before they may be willing to share their CTI
with the C3ISP Framework. Different prosumers will choose dif-
ferent DMOs to perform this sanitization. Table 4 summarizes the
DMOs (Data Manipulation Operations) that need to be available
to each Pilot.
6. Implementation, acceptance tests and validation
In this section, we briefly describe the implementation, the
acceptance and validation methodology, and the results of the
validation performed so far.
6.1. Implementation
The development was carried out using Jenkins to manage the
continuous integration and deployment automation processes.
Jenkins was integrated with various quality and assurance tools,
in particular: CheckStyle for Java code syntactical checking and
standard adherence; FindBugs and FindSecurityBugs for Java code
bugs discovering and security static analysis; OWASP Dependency
Check for checking security vulnerabilities in external code de-
pendencies (e.g. used Java libraries); the Junit framework for cre-
ating unit tests; Cobertura for measuring the percentage of code
covered by the unit test and for identifying code not involved in
the tests.
The developed C3ISP infrastructure runs in a series of VMs
(with a VMware hypervisor) on Ubuntu 16.04.3 LTS as shown
in Table 5 below. The base configuration includes the following
software components: Oracle Java Development Kit, version 1.8;
GCC (GNU project C and C++ compiler), version 5.4; and Python,
versions 2.7 and 3.5. OpenLDAP was used as the initial user
authentication and identification repository, but it is planned
to enhance this with Open ID Connect. All the infrastructure
components support REST interfaces and SpringBoot was used in
their development.
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Table 3
Mapping of CTI collection components.
Pilot CTI source Data owners Component responsible for collection
ISP Dedicated services and Registro.it ISPs C3ISP Gateway (Security Scan Software client)
CERT Prosumers’ systems Prosumers and CERT C3ISP Gateway (Prosumer specific clients TBD)
ENT MSSP’s Data Lake Enterprise customers C3ISP Gateway (Data Lake client)
SME MSS SMEs C3ISP Gateway (MSS client)
Table 4
Availability of DMO components.
Pilot Component responsible for DMO processing Type of DMO processing
Plain text formatting Pseudonymisation Anonymization Homomorphic encryption
ISP Local ISI Yes No Yes Yes
CERT Local and remote ISI Yes No Yes Yes
ENT Central ISI Yes No Yes No
SME Local ISI Yes Yes No No
Table 5
C3ISP virtual machine.
VM CPU RAM GB DISK GB
ISI 4 12 100
IAI 8 16 400
DSA Manager 2 4 40
Audit Manager 1 2 22
Key Enc Manager 8 16 100
6.2. Performance evaluation
Fig. 6 shows the time required by our framework to perform
the DetectDGA3 analytic, reporting the time of the internal com-
ponents depicted in Fig. 2. From Fig. 6 we can clearly see that
the execution time is mainly due to the time required to execute
the DetectDGA analytic and to execute the decryption operation
by the Bundle Manager (which is internal to the DSA Adapter
component). Remember that all the CTI is stored encrypted in
DPOs so has to be decrypted before any data analysis can be
performed. These times grow with the size of the DPO. The
time required by the Usage Control component (which is the
authorization engine embedded in the DSA Adapter component)
to perform the evaluation of the usage control policy is about 1 s,
and it does not depend on the size of the DPO. In fact, it depends
on the complexity of the policy. Both the times required by the
DPOS API to read the DPO from the DPOS and the time required by
the Buffer Manager and the Format Adapter components to create
a data lake in the right format for the execution of the analytics
are very low with respect to the other components. For instance,
to read a DPO of 10 kb, 1 Mb, and 3 Mb takes respectively about
70, 270, and 330 ms.
6.3. Validation methodology
The pilots are validating the operation of the infrastructure
in two stages. The first stage was to define a comprehensive set
of functional and non-functional acceptance tests for each of the
pilots, based on their requirements for the confidential sharing
and analysis of CTI data. 30 acceptance tests were defined in total
for the ISP pilot, of which 8 appertained to the collection and con-
fidential sharing of CTI — the subject of this paper. 15 tests were
3 The DetectDGA analytic works on DNS request logs and identifies whether
domain names have been resolved within domains that refer to a Domain
Generating Algorithm (DGA). These domains are often used by malware to
register new domains on the fly to avoid the malware depending on a fixed
domain or an IP address that could quickly be blocked. Thus, the malware
switches to a new domain at regular intervals and thus prevents a new version
of the malware needing to be released.
Fig. 6. Example ISP Pilot in policies in CNL for the validation.
defined for the CERT pilot, of which 8 related to this paper; 22
were defined for the SME pilot, of which 10 related to this paper,
and 27 for the enterprise pilot, of which 7 related to this paper.
The second stage was the application of the Goal, Question, Metric
(GQM) [47] method to the user stories associated with each of the
C3ISP pilots. The GQM method incorporates the acceptance tests
as a set of questions, as a way of obtaining key evidence from
the users regarding the acceptance tests and the validation of the
C3ISP Framework.
6.4. Validation results
At the time of writing, the C3ISP project was 30 months
through its 36-month timeframe, so some of the components
were not fully implemented, for example, not all the CTI san-
itization or analytical functions were available. In particular,
the homomorphic encryption function was only available in the
cloud/central ISI, and not in the local ISI, meaning that Trust Level
5 cannot currently be supported. Consequently, whilst we were
able to test the various deployment models and levels of trust, we
could not validate that the implementation had reached sufficient
maturity to be able to cater for all the identified sanitization
requirements and levels of trust. However, sufficient of them
were available to show that both data sanitization and data ana-
lytics can be performed by the C3ISP infrastructure. When other
functions become available they should be able to be plugged
into the infrastructure via the REST interfaces that have been
defined and validated. Finally, the user-friendly GUIs were not
all complete. The testing to date has allowed us to gather direct
feedback from the project’s stakeholders in order to steer the
remaining activities during the final months of the project.
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6.4.1. The ISP pilot validation results
The ISP Pilot used both synthetic and test CTI data for its
validation. The test data was extracted from the BIND DNS server
hosted in the testbed virtual machine, and generated for the pur-
poses of internal validation. The synthetic data was from a BIND
DNS server of an ISP that participated during the requirements
collection phase, and made its data available for the validation
phase. The size of the test log was 10 kb with 79 requests. In
comparison the synthetic log was ∼30 Mb with 250 k requests.
In general, the functionality related to CTI data collection and
sharing performed well for small files: the pilot was able to up-
load and retrieve CTI data to and from the C3ISP Framework. With
larger files e.g. the synthetic CTI, the testers reported that the
Format Adapter, DPOS and DetectDGA analytics function worked
well but required a number of seconds to process large CTI files
(see Fig. 6).
During the validation, the testers were able to set up policies
to manage the DPO access. Fig. 7 shows four policies (three
authorizations and one prohibition) defined for the validation.
Of the 8 relevant acceptance tests, 4 Passed, whilst 3 Partially
Passed and 1 was N/A (not available yet) due to the lack of full
feature availability.
6.4.2. The CERT pilot validation results
The CERT Pilot used a combination of real and honeypot data.
The majority of data used for validation was real data either
coming from public sources or provided by CERT stakeholders.
One ISP provided a set of real emails to be analysed for spam anal-
ysis, together with a set of malware collected through internal
honeypots.
Of the 8 relevant CERT acceptance tests, 5 were reported as
Passed, 2 as Partial, and 1 as N/A. The tests marked as Partial or
N/A were due to a lack of full analysis functionality.
The CERT Pilot reported that the CTI sharing aspects of the
C3ISP Framework worked well. Since it used only small email
data files, no performance problems were encountered when
importing or retrieving data from the framework ISI. The CERT
partner was quite happy with the DSA Editor, but reported being
able to create only a subset of the desired policies.
6.4.3. The enterprise pilot validation results
The Enterprise Pilot used two public datasets of cyber security
information for the validation:
1. Intrusion Detection System dataset from ‘‘1999 DARPA In-
trusion Detection Evaluation Dataset’’,4 week 2 training
data.
2. Honeypot dataset from ‘‘DDS Dataset Collection’’.
An additional synthetic Malware alerts dataset was derived
from a subset of the public honeypot data (i.e. using the Source IPs
and their geolocation, and assigning them with malware names).
The reason for this was motivated by the need to ensure compli-
ance with the legal obligations in processing real data, consider-
ing the limited maturity of the implementation of C3ISP Project
(e.g. full privacy could not be assured).
Of the 10 relevant acceptance tests specified for the Enterprise
Pilot, 5 were reported as Passed, 4 as Partially Passed and 1 as
Not Assessed. The validation method foresaw the involvement
of these pilot stakeholders: domain experts and cyber security
analysts. They were presented with a demo and asked to fill in the
questionnaire. These surveys received generally positive feedback




The Pilot reported that the C3ISP Framework functionality
for CTI sharing, search and retrieval worked very well, as did
the user-end Pilot-specific software. One of the pilot strategic
objectives was to combine the new data sharing and analysis
capabilities brought by C3ISP with the existing MSSP legacy solu-
tions. The surveys reported that the legacy Saturn analytics and
their C3ISP support framework (creation and population of the
data lake) were quite successful. The end-users were generally
satisfied with DSA policy editing (which was performed by se-
curity experts), but would prefer to be able to create policies
based on data classifications (such as less sensitive, sensitive,
highly sensitive). This can be achieved by creating pre-defined
DSA templates that are ready to be instantiated as DSAs.
6.4.4. SME pilot
This Pilot used primarily a combination of simulated attack
data and passive test environment data. The simulated attack
data included Firewall and Anti-Malware events triggered by the
tester through simulation scripts. Passive test environment data
included CTI events encountered during normal operations by an
SME host.
Of the 7 relevant acceptance tests, 5 Passed, 2 Partially Passed,
and 0 were N/A.
Interestingly, some Y/N questions were answered Y by the
developers and N by the SME users. The SME users reported that
this was due to the MSS Server and DSA Editor user interfaces
being very difficult to use. However, DSA search/selection and
importing CTI to the C3ISP Framework worked well using the
end-user Portal software.
Regarding the analysis, we developed a specific analytic ser-
vice for the SME pilot, termed findAttackingHosts, which analyses
firewall CTI data for attacks, and lists the IP addresses of attacking
hosts. We used four sets of CTI data for testing the analysis,
which were: GridPocket, UniKent, BT, and a combined set (that
contains all the former three individual datasets). We ran the
analysis over each organization’s own data separately, and then
ran the analysis over the collaborative data as well, in order to
determine if combining data reveals new IP addresses for each
organization. We set 50 as the threshold of the attack count,
which means that we consider an IP address malicious if it tries
to establish a connection more than 50 times. Table 6 shows the
incoming IP addresses that are detected 50 or more times. We can
observe that UniKent and BT detected one malicious host each,
i.e. 10.255.92.123 and 129.12.21.67 respectively, and GridPocket
detected 17. However, by using the collaborative data, a new host
(i.e. 91.189.95.83) was revealed, which was below the threshold
of each organization’s individual dataset. We found that this host
was detected by BT 48 times and by GridPocket 2 times. So,
by performing the C3ISP analysis service over collaborative data,
new malicious hosts can be revealed and the result is mutually
beneficial for all the SMEs. Another benefit of collaboration is
that one SME that has already been attacked (e.g. GridPocket) can
reveal its attackers to the other SMEs through the collaborative
results, perhaps before they themselves are aware of it.
7. Limitations, conclusion and future work
The C3ISP project’s objective is to define a collaborative and
confidential information sharing, analysis and protection infras-
tructure as a service for cyber security management. It caters for
a wide range of trust levels, ranging from full trust in both the
cloud infrastructure provider and the collaborating parties to no
trust in any of them. Four deployment models are supported in
order to cater for the various levels of trust, and range from all CTI
data processing being performed in the cloud to all CTI processing
being performed in edge devices. Even though the project still had
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Fig. 7. Example ISP pilot in policies in CNL for the validation.
Table 6
Table of attacking IP addresses.

























91.189.95.83 (48) (2) 50
several months to run at the time of writing, and several features
were either not integrated or only partially implemented, nev-
ertheless the validation results show that the C3ISP architecture
performs according to its design. Four different pilot were used
in the validation, and each had its own requirements for trust
and CTI data protection, resulting in different deployments for
processing CTI data in either the edge and/or the cloud.
This architecture is successful because Data Sharing Agree-
ment (DSA) policies are stuck to the CTI data, in Data Protected
Objects (DPOs) and the DSA is enforced at either the edge or the
cloud, or both, giving users confidence that their sensitive data
will not leak to untrusted or partially trusted entities before it
is appropriately sanitized. A limitation of the current design is
that all DPOs that are shared for analysis have to have the same
common DSA policy encapsulated in them. This means that all
the cooperating organizations must agree on the common DSA
to use with their CTI before the data sharing starts. We recog-
nize the inconvenience of this, but must weight this against the
complexity of trying to resolve conflicts between different DSAs
that want to merge their CTI for analysis. Due to the complexity
of the DSAs, comprising as they do of: Data Manipulation Oper-
ations, enhanced XACML policies to support usage control, and
obligations to support policy inheritance, we believe that defining
algorithms to support policy merging and conflict resolution is a
complete research project of its own right.
Another current implementation limitation (though not a de-
sign limitation) is that local ISIs can only move DPOs to a single
cloud based ISI, and a cloud based ISI cannot share its DPOs with
other cloud based ISIs. Once this limitation is removed, the C3ISP
platforms hosted by both the CERT and the Enterprise pilots (and
ultimately by any other organization) will be able to share their
CTIs and/or DPOs with each other for subsequent analysis.
Other limitations are that the C3ISP infrastructure is complex
and large, and requires security experts to initiate the policy
templates. Consequently, we envisage that specialist IT security
organizations that process CTI on behalf of others are the only
ones likely to have the specialist skills and knowledge necessary
to be the operators of the infrastructure, and to run it as a service
for others.
Finally, we have some implementation activities already
scheduled on the short-term roadmap that are still to be com-
pleted. These include: completing the CTI sanitization functional-
ity, adding an OpenID Connect federated identity management
infrastructure for single sign on; implementing a Secure Audit
Manager, most probably using the Elastic Stack open source
solution; and adding additional analytics services to improve
threat detection. Non-functional improvements include improved
GUIs and increased performance.
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